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A B S T R A C T
The emergence of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) in the landscape of the U.S. healthcare system marks a
paradigm shift in healthcare operations. The potential impact of ACOs has been a topic of intense debate.
Traditional analytical approaches do not lend themselves to examining the complex phenomenon of the emer-
gence and growth of ACOs in the healthcare network. We adopt a complex adaptive system lens to examine the
growth of ACOs among physician groups and explore factors that influence this growth. We also discuss the
impact of ACOs on the profit of physician groups. An agent-based model was built to simulate physician groups'
ACO entrance and exit based on a set of simple rules and their complex interactions with other agents. Based on
the simulation results, we derive patterns of ACO expansion and contraction, following four stages of wait-and-
see, rollercoaster, fast growth, and stabilizing. Findings suggest that the growth of ACOs is sensitive to the
initial state of ACO membership. When the initial size of ACO membership increases, it helps to eliminate the
rollercoaster stage. In addition, the growth of the ACO varies depending on the cost–quality tradeoff. When both
cost and quality objectives can be met simultaneously, the growth of ACO membership follows wait-and-see and
fast growth stages followed by a different stage that we term sticky state. The impact of ACOs on physician
groups’ cumulative profit varies by the service quality level of the physician group. Physician groups affiliated
with insurance companies charging the lowest or the highest level of health insurance premiums are worse off
with the ACO option. However, the ACO benefits physician groups affiliated with an insurance company charging
a moderate level of premiums.
1. Introduction
The emergence of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) is a
nascent yet influential event in the evolution of the U.S. healthcare sys-
tem. Understandably, there has not been any consensus reached over
ACOs’ impacts on the healthcare network (Gamble, 2013; Gold, 2011;
Muhlestein, 2013). In fact, since the inception of ACOs at the national
level in 2012, there have been fierce debates over the ability of these
organizations to meet their performance goals, as well as any unintended
consequences that could adversely impact members of the health supply
network (Dove et al., 2009; Numerof, 2011).
One of the factors contributing to the debate is that it is extremely
difficult to realistically assess the effects of ACOs, due to the inherent
complexity of the U.S. healthcare system (Burns et al., 2002). A health-
care supply network is comprised of numerous entities/organizations
(such as patient groups, physician groups, and insurance companies;
Burns and Pauly, 2002). In order to provide healthcare services to pa-
tients, these entities engage in complex relationships to allocate re-
sources and simultaneously compete with other healthcare providers in
the region (Plsek, 2001). Further, these entities are self-regulating
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(Anderson et al., 2003) and they learn and adapt to changes in the
environment (Wilson and Holt, 2001). Their adaptive behaviors present a
significant challenge in understanding the implications of ACOs using a
conventional model that is based on the assumption of central planning
at the network level (Pathak et al., 2007).
However, where conventional models have failed, we believe the
complex adaptive system (CAS) approach will work. A complex adaptive
system is a theoretical framework that embraces complexity and views
organizations as living, adaptable, changeable systems (Choi et al.,
2001). If we view the healthcare supply network as a CAS, then a single
change in the environment, such as the creation of ACOs, could have
complex ripple effects when traveling through the myriad relationships
within a healthcare supply network. In addition, the CAS perspective
allows agents such as physician groups to learn and adapt to changes in
the environment, which provides a realistic representation of the com-
plex dynamics among healthcare supply networks. In this research, we
use the CAS lens to examine the growth of ACOs, a pressing issue in
healthcare. Accordingly, we present our first research question: How
does ACO membership expand and contract over time?
Because one defining characteristic associated with a complex system
is its sensitivity to initial conditions (Kolen and Pollack, 1990), we also
set out to discover whether different levels of participation by physician
groups at the onset of ACO formation will impact the development stages
of the ACO. In addition, as scholars have long observed the quality and
cost tradeoff in various disciplines such as manufacturing (Farooq et al.,
2017), project management (Khang and Myint, 1999), and mathematics
and computation (Tareghian and Taheri, 2006), we investigate how the
quality and cost tradeoff impacts the expansion and contraction of ACOs.
Thus, our second research question is: What factors impact the expansion
and contraction patterns of ACOs?
Lastly, we investigated the impact of ACOs on physician groups’ profit
and delineated this effect at the service quality level. This finding helps
health service providers to make strategic decisions on whether or not to
join an ACO. Here, we formally put forward our third research question:
How does the creation of ACOs impact the profit of physician groups?
And how does this impact vary among different physician groups?
By answering these three questions, our research provides policy
guidance on the ACO, its deployment strategy, and its potential impact.
This policy guidance is much needed in this very early stage of imple-
menting ACOs and could potentially shape the U.S. healthcare supply
network. Specifically, we modeled the responses of supply network agents
(i.e., patients, physician groups, and insurance companies) to changes in
the environment (i.e., the formation of ACOs), the complex interactions
created by their responses, and the impact of these complex interactions on
the expansion of ACO networks as well as on the profit generation of
physician groups. In addition, we examine factors that can impact the
growth of ACOs. Understanding these factors can assist policy makers to
design and adjust program parameters in order to better deploy ACOs.
Besides significant policy guidance, by applying the CAS perspective
our research, makes important theoretical contributions to supply
network research, especially research in healthcare supply networks.
First, we extend our understanding of the behaviors of the healthcare
supply network as a CAS, which responds to calls from Operations and
Supply Chain Management (O&SCM) scholars (Carter et al., 2015;
Pathak et al., 2007) to take a more realistic look at the complex nature of
supply networks. Second, we create a stagemodel and derived patterns of
expansion and contraction of ACOs, which is novel in healthcare supply
network research.
The rest of the paper is divided into the following sections. Section 2
provides background information on the formation of ACOs in the
context of the U.S. healthcare service supply network and explains how
the CAS lens offers a superior theoretical framework to investigate dy-
namics within this complex healthcare supply network. Section 3 ex-
plains the methodology. Section 4 sets up the agent-based model. Section
5 presents findings and discussion. Section 6 provides conclusions, im-
plications, and future research directions.
2. Research background
2.1. Accountable Care Organizations
The healthcare delivery system of the United States has traditionally
been thought of as independent systems (Rice et al., 2013), where “care
has been delivered by multiple providers with little or no coordination”
(Barnes et al., 2014). This fragmentation leads to issues with high
healthcare cost and low quality (Barnes et al., 2014). In an attempt to
solve these issues, the Affordable Care Act passed in 2010 funded the
establishment of ACOs. These organizations are “groups of doctors,
hospitals, and other healthcare providers, who come together voluntarily
to give coordinated high quality care to the Medicare patients they serve”
(CMS.gov). The emergence of ACOs in the landscape of U.S. healthcare
marks a paradigm shift in healthcare operations (Bohmer and Lee, 2009;
Song et al., 2012). Projections call for more than 50% of U.S. hospitals to
be participating in the ACOmodel, representing a dramatic increase from
5% in its inception year of 2012.
Moving away from the traditional pay-for-service model, the ACO is a
payment and care delivery model that attempts to explicitly connect
provider reimbursements to quality metrics and reductions in the total
cost of care for a population under consideration. The motive behind the
establishment of ACOs is cost savings for Medicare services (Fisher et al.,
2009). If an ACO can meet the cost-saving goals, then physician groups
affiliated with the ACO will be awarded a percentage of the savings
(CMS.gov) by the Federal government of the United States. The savings
are calculated by the Center of Medicare Services, a branch of the U.S.
Federal government, based on historical benchmark to an ACO's per
capita expenditures during the performance year. To qualify for the
savings, an ACOmust meet or exceed a predetermined cost saving as well
as quality criteria. Thus, there is a direct incentive for physician groups to
improve quality of care and reduce total cost of care. It is hoped that such
an alignment of goals between the healthcare system and the payer (e.g.,
Government for Medicare) will result in a more effective and efficient
system. Operationally, the ACO model requires physician groups and
other healthcare providers to come together to provide coordinated care
to patients. The ACO assumes financial risk for some part of patient care
and gets rewarded with a bonus if the cost of providing care is below
budget while meeting certain quality requirements.
With the increased awareness of ACOs, there have been calls for using
analytics to help healthcare suppliers use healthcare resources “as effi-
ciently as possible in a population perspective” (Terry, 2013). Our
research answers this call. We examine the growth of the ACO and its
impact on members of the healthcare supply network. We believe that in
order to realistically model this phenomenon and understand its impli-
cations, it is important to adopt a CAS perspective for the following
reasons. First, an ACO is embedded in a web of agents in a healthcare
supply network such as insurance groups, patients, and physician groups.
These agents have their own sets of attributes, goals, and behavioral
rules, resulting in a rugged landscape (Kauffman and Levin, 1987; Pathak
et al., 2007) that cannot be studied in a well-organized linear manner.
Second, an ACO is made up of physician groups that interact directly and
indirectly with other agents in the healthcare system and it is difficult to
decompose these effects into linear terms due to the varying actions of
the agents. Third, the ACO represents a key change to the environment of
U.S. health systems, and agents such as physician groups observe, learn,
and adapt to this change. This type of learning and adaptation behavior
cannot be modeled using a conventional linear approach (Dooley, 1997).
The CAS lens adds realism and practicality to a research model that
captures such learning and adaptation behavior.
2.2. Healthcare supply network as a complex adaptive system
The envisioning of a supply network—whether it is a physical ma-
terial supply network or a healthcare service supply network—as a CAS,
is relatively new in O&SCM (Carter et al., 2015; Pathak et al., 2007). The
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study conducted by Choi et al. (2001) was one of the first to suggest a
shift of research paradigm from an organized view of supply networks to
one that incorporates complexity. They argue that supply networks
emerge rather than being planned by a single entity. Therefore, managers
should balance the need for control with the need to allow the supply
network to emerge through processes of self-organization and
adaptation.
Many researchers have joined in promoting the use of a CAS
perspective in supply network issues. Notably, Pathak et al. (2007)
reviewed an extensive list of peer-reviewed journals and identified de-
velopments in theory, methodology, and techniques used in CAS
research. They also noticed that most of these developments were outside
the domain of O&SCM. They subsequently addressed opportunities and
challenges of applying CAS to O&SCM. Focusing the application of CAS
on the specific area of disaster relief, Day (2014) explained why CAS
might be the most appropriate theoretical framework to guide the un-
derstanding of supply network operation in the event of disasters, and set
forth propositions on how to improve supply network resilience. Most
recently, Carter et al. (2015) recognized the lack of theoretical devel-
opment in supply chain management and proposed a framework to
conceptualize the supply chain domain. In their effort, the CAS lens was
used as the foundational premise for conceptualization of the supply
chain.
Besides addressing CAS in O&SCM conceptually, various researchers
have ventured to apply the CAS lens to a specific supply network phe-
nomenon, notably in the area of inter-firm collaboration. For example,
Holweg and Pil (2008) conducted case studies to examine the complex
nature of supply chain coordination and found that the CAS lens com-
plements findings derived from other competing theories. Nair et al.
(2009) simulated supply chain coordination with an agent-based model
and put forth propositions regarding cooperative relationship develop-
ment in a supply network. Kim (2009) examined trust at the local agent
level and its impact at the system level. A recent research by Li et al.
(2021) studied buyer firm's financial squeeze and its impact on the
buyer's extended supply network, via complex interactions. Besides
inter-firm collaboration, scholars have also examined the effect of supply
chain complexity on plant performance (Bozarth et al., 2009), mutual
influences between properties of human agents and properties of supply
chain systems (Tangpong et al., 2014), abnormal flow patterns in supply
streams (Sawaya et al., 2015), and the relationship between learning and
adaptation in supply networks located within industrial districts (Gian-
noccaro, 2015). Table 1 summarizes key research in supply network as a
CAS.
As shown in Table 1, we are not aware of any supply chain research
that applies the CAS lens to the growth of ACOs in the healthcare domain.
The lack of research in this area is perhaps due to the nascency of the
ACO concept and how little is known about its effectiveness. In addition
to the novelty in the ACO context, we note that few existing studies
address the evolutionary aspect of the supply network (Yan et al., 2021).
By examining the growth patterns of ACO members, we trace the
expansion of ACO networks over several years and portray the stages of
ACO network growth. In this regard, our research is theoretically new
and exciting, and enhances understanding of the evolution of healthcare
supply networks.
3. Methodology
Our research was executed in two steps. In step one, we constructed
an empirically based healthcare supply network and worked with
healthcare providers to understand tradeoffs of joining an ACO and the
reasons behind the tradeoffs. In step two, we built an agent-based model,
based on the healthcare supply network, to simulate the growth of the
ACO and its impact on the cumulative profit of healthcare supply
network members. We outline these two steps in detail below.
3.1. Empirical data on healthcare supply network
Because the ACO was pioneered in 2012 and subsequently opened up
to all healthcare facilities in 2013, we traced back to the 2012 HIMSS
Analytics™ Database (HIMSS) to define structures of the healthcare
supply network and derive cost and quality parameters for physician
groups belonging to an ACO. The HIMSS database compiles annual sur-
veys of care delivery organizations across the United States. The survey
items cover a wide range of U.S. healthcare suppliers' characteristics and
operational practices. We linked this dataset to the 2013 Hospital-
Compare database published by Medicare.gov. HospitalCompare cap-
tures healthcare providers’ performance data such as quality of service
and patient satisfaction. We chose to construct network-level data based
on data collected in year 2012 and lag our performance variables by one
year, because research has shown that the effects of organizational
changes are likely to manifest in subsequent years (Devaraj and Kohli,
2003). In addition, because the development of a complex adaptive
system is sensitive to initial conditions (Kolen and Pollack, 1990), it is
imperative that we model the structure of the network based on data
from the inception of the ACO in 2012.
Based on the HIMSS data, we mapped a healthcare supply network
located in the Midwest region of the United States. We chose the Midwest
region to represent a generic healthcare system in the United States, as
healthcare systems in the East or West regions of the country may be
confounded by other factors such as a diverse population profile, which
may lead to healthcare disparities (Riley, 2012), as well as different
trajectory of healthcare-related technologies (Feibus, 2015). We noted
Table 1
Summary of research in supply network as a complex adaptive system.
Author (year) Methodology/type Findings
Choi et al. (2001) Conceptual The first paper to envision
supply networks as CAS.
Pathak et al. (2007) Conceptual Identify challenges and
opportunities of applying CAS
in supply network research.
Holweg& Pil (2008) Case study CAS helps to explain supply
chain coordination and
complements findings
supported by other competing
theories.




Kim (2009) Agent-based modeling Trust in local agents and its
impact at system level.
Bozarth et al. (2009) Survey research Empirical examination of
supply chain complexity on
plant performance.




Survey and experiments Examination of the mutual
influences between properties
of human agents and
properties of supply chain
systems.




flow patterns in supply
streams.
Carter et al. (2015) Conceptual Theorization of supply chain
as a CAS.
Giannoccaro (2015) Agent-based modeling Investigated the relationship
between learning and
adaptation in supply networks
located within industrial
districts.
Li et al. (2021) Agent-based modeling Examined the impact of
financial squeeze on buyer's
extended supply network.
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the number of physician groups, the number of ACO groups, and the
patient base in the region. More importantly, we examined empirically
the cost–quality tradeoff for healthcare providers that have joined the
ACO. Although the stated objective for ACOs is to cut costs while
improving quality, research shows mixed results of ACOs’ impact on
quality (Kelleher et al., 2015). In order to realistically model the supply
network dynamics, we analyzed empirical data to derive a realistic
parameter for cost–quality tradeoff for healthcare suppliers affiliated
with ACOs.
Based on the empirical data, we noticed that there are 60 physician
groups in theMidwest region wemodeled, serving the needs of a 200,000
patient base. Initially 5% of the physician groups joined an ACO.We used
these parameters to set up our agent-based model. Table 2 summarizes
these parameters.
3.2. Cost–quality tradeoff
In the next step, we first analyzed the empirical data to derive the cost
and quality tradeoff associated with joining an ACO group and then
interviewed subject matter experts (SMEs) in this region to understand
the reasons behind the cost and quality tradeoffs. When analyzing the
cost–quality tradeoff associated with ACO membership, we compared
mean values of service quality across two groups: ACOmembers and non-
ACO members. Results of mean comparison for service quality levels
across these two groups are reported in Table 3. We then conducted two
independent sample t-tests using SPSS version 20. Results of the t-tests
are reported in Table 4.
Empirical data support service quality degradation for members of
the ACO. As indicated in Table 3, the mean value and standard deviation
of service quality for non-ACO members is 71.387 (standard deviation ¼
5.157) and for ACO members is 69.778 (standard deviation ¼ 5.283).
The mean value of service quality is higher for non-ACO members than
for ACO members.
Based on Table 4, Levene's Test for Equality of Variance did not reject
the assumption of the equality of variance. Therefore, we proceeded with
interpreting results based on an equality of variance assumption. Results
show a statistically significant difference in the mean values of service
quality across the two groups. The p-value is < 0.001. The confidence
interval is (0.864, 2.355) and does not contain the value of 0. Both the p-
value and the confidence interval validate that the difference in mean
value is statistically significant. Thus we conclude there is a quality
tradeoff for healthcare providers that are members of an ACO. Even
though improving quality is stated as part of the goals of ACOs
(CMS.gov), there is degradation in service quality for ACO members.
3.3. Interview with physician groups
We worked with local healthcare providers and physician group ad-
ministrators to examine the reasons behind the quality and cost tradeoffs.
We chose these SMEs based on their tenure, area of expertise, and job
functions. Specifically, we interviewed SMEs from two sides of the ACO
to provide a comprehensive understanding: the healthcare administra-
tor's side and the healthcare worker's side. From the administrator's side,
we interviewed one healthcare executive who helped to establish
numerous ACO groups. From the healthcare workers' side, we inter-
viewed a surgeon who is also the head of a physician group, as well as a
registered nurse. All SMEs are fully cognizant of ACO formation and have
on average over 30 years of experience in the medical field. They pro-
vided validation of our results and cited reasons for the reduction of
service quality as the limitation of treatment options for patients and
reduction in treatment flexibility.
Based on our interviews with medical professionals, once physician
groups joined an ACO, physicians are taking more and more risks with
the patient base. “If there is a medical loss from a group of patients, the
doctors basically have to pay back some of the money,” stated one
medical professional during our interview. As a result, doctors are
exercising tighter control in their referral patterns in order to reduce
costs and meet cost targets. For example, a general surgeon noted that “in
this day and age of ACOs, I am doing less hernia surgeries than I used to.”
He attributed the reason for the reduction of surgery to the change of
referral patterns from the primary care doctors, who are now the gate-
keepers of patient problems. “The patients still have the same complaints
that ‘Hey, I got hernia and I want to get it fixed.’ Now they are told in a
higher percentage that you don't need to get it fixed. Don't worry about
it.” The patients were told to put off a hernia operation in order to reduce
the amount of this surgery and the associated costs. This limitation of
treatment options reduces patient satisfaction.
A similar story was shared on knee and hip replacements. Because of
the high costs associated with these surgeries (a quote was given during
our interview that “those are $50,000 operations”), if too many of these
surgeries are allowed, “that is going to show up negatively on your
bottom line.” As a result, patients must go through a series of less
expensive treatments before they are allowed to get a replacement. Thus,
there is a decrease in treatment flexibility. One physician observed that
“there is a decrease in services that patients are used to and coming to
expect, which results in decrease in patient satisfaction.” Interview
Table 2
Key parameters used in the base scenario.
Parameter Setting
Patient base 200,000
Total number of physician groups 60
Initial percentage of physician groups in an ACO 5% (or 3 out of 60)
Penalty parameter for service quality (applies to ACO
members only)
0.92
Administrative cost associated with joining ACO $20,000
Table 3
Means and standard deviations of service quality levels: ACO members vs. non-
ACO members.




Non-ACO members 2,763 71.39 5.16 0.10
ACO members 198 69.78 5.28 0.38
Table 4
Comparison of mean values of service quality levels: ACO members vs. non-ACO members.
Levene's test for equality
for variances
t-Test for equality of means





Equal variances assumed 0.13 0.72 4.24 2959 0.00 1.61 0.38 0.86 2.35
Equal variances not assumed 4.15 224.75 0.00 1.61 0.39 0.84 2.37
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protocol, interview questions, and resporesponses are available upon
request.
With this empirical validation, we then proceeded with an estimation
of the degree of quality degradation for members associated with an
ACO. Here we regressed ACO membership on service quality, and the
resulting model was statistically significant at the p < 0.001 level. We
relied on the coefficient of correlation, r, to estimate the degree of quality
degradation. The r value was 0.08 and we therefore factored in an 8%
quality degradation for ACO members for the base scenario. We later
varied this parameter to perform subsequent what-if analysis.
3.4. Agent-based model
An agent-based model (ABM) is a type of computational model that
simulates the actions and interactions of autonomous agents with a view
to assessing their effects on the simulated system as a whole. It allows
direct representation of individual entities (as agents) and their in-
teractions in a system. ABMs have applications in diverse real-world
problems, and have become increasingly popular as a modeling approach
in many disciplines of research. Table 5 provides examples of ABMs used
in a variety of disciplines (Arifin et al., 2016).
In O&SCM, the ABM technique has been applied to modeling the
supply network as a CAS (Giannoccaro, 2015; Kim, 2009; Nair et al.,
2009; etc.). An ABM offers several advantages over other modeling
techniques. For one, it allows researchers to link behavioral rules
resulting from the interactions of individual agents to aggregate or
complex patterns, and to capture the emergent phenomena at the macro
or network level (Bonabeau, 2002). In addition, an ABM can accom-
modate heterogeneity in that each agent can operate according to its
own preferences or its own rules of action (Marchi and Page, 2014). The
third advantage of an ABM is that it can simulate learning at both the
agent level and the network level. In a CAS, agents can be adaptive in
their actions and interactions with other agents (Macy and Willer,
2002). For example, agents adapt by imitating and/or replicating. These
adaptive behaviors cannot be modeled by a conventional linear model
(Pathak et al., 2007), as a linear model does not allow the continuous
adjustments of independent constructs in response to changes in
dependent constructs. Finally, in general, an ABM offers the most nat-
ural way for describing and simulating a system composed of behavioral
entities, offering a closer representation of reality. This holds true for
most of the applications of ABM presented in Table 5 and is one of the
major reasons for the choice of ABM over other modeling techniques in
our study.
In the healthcare context, the use of agent-based modeling is rapidly
growing, and scholars have recognized the suitability of adopting ABM in
healthcare research (Barnes et al., 2013). For example, Kanagarajah et al.
(2010) adopt ABM to demonstrate the complications of healthcare sys-
tem improvement in the context of an emergency department. Their
work proves the nonlinear behaviors of healthcare service delivery and
showcases the applicability of ABM in evaluating healthcare services.
Similarly, Xie and Peng (2012) use ABM to investigate the reduction in
waiting time and improvement in resource utilization of the operating
room in a hospital. They model patients in the healthcare system as
agents with autonomous and adaptive behaviors. Their findings validate
the effectiveness of utilizing ABM in improving decision making in the
healthcare context. ABM has also been applied to the spread of infectious
disease (Laskowski et al., 2011; Xie and Peng, 2012), calculation of
healthcare return on investments (Blachowicz et al., 2008; Kruzikas
et al., 2014), and discovering interventions to increase population well-
ness (Silverman et al., 2015). For an extensive review of the application
of ABM in various healthcare contexts, please refer to Barnes et al.
(2013).
4. Modeling the healthcare supply network with ABM
4.1. Empirically based ABM
We model the evolution of ACO formation in a region in the Midwest
part of the United States (Region S). Region S's healthcare supply
network is characterized by a 200,000 patient base, three insurance
groups, and 60 physician offices, 5% of which participate in an ACO.
4.2. Model architecture
In general, the three major components of an ABM are agents, envi-
ronment, and rules. Agents can be individual or collective entities (such
as organizations or groups). Each agent represents an actor in the simu-
lated (virtual) environment in which it interacts with other agents.
Employing a set of rules, agents individually assess the environment and
make decisions. As a whole, the set of agents, the environment, and the
rules, with their clearly defined boundaries, inputs, and outputs,
compose the ABM (Arifin et al., 2016).
The ACO ABM consists of four major agent types: Patients, Physician
Groups, Insurance Companies, and Accountable Care Organizations. Each
Patient agent is connected to a Physician Group agent and an Insurance
Company agent. An Insurance Company agent can have multiple Physician
Group agents, each of which can potentially be connected to an
Table 5






Stock market management (Arthur et al., 1997)
Software agents (shopbots and pricebots) (Kephart et al.,
2000)
Supply chains management (Macal et al., 2004;
Swaminathan et al., 1998; Julka et al., 2002)
Intelligent manufacturing (Shen and Norrie, 1999; Shen
et al., 2006)
Credit risk analysis (Yan et al., 2021)
Wholesale electricity market (Sueyoshi and Tadiparthi,
2008)
Operational risk and organizational design (Bonabeau,
2002)
Consumer purchasing behavior (North et al., 2010)








Product development on the Internet (Holweg and Pil,
2008)
Robot control, robot manufacturing, computer graphics,
entertainment, games, music, economics, Internet,
information processing, industrial design, electronics,
security, data mining, telecommunications, etc. (Macal,
2009; Kim and Cho, 2006)
Control systems (Jennings and Bussmann, 2003)
Social computing and social intelligence (Wilson and Holt,
2001)
Decision support systems (Bui and Lee, 1999; Power and




Ecology Ecology (general) (Grimm and Railsback, 2013)
Predator-prey relationships (killer whales and sea lions/
sea otters)
(Testa et al., 2012)
Land use (Matthews et al., 2007; Castella et al., 2005)
Forest ecosystem management (Nute et al., 2004)
Environment
Infrastructures
Environmental health impact (Sokolova and Fernandez-
Caballero, 2009)
Critical infrastructures modeling (Rinaldi, 2004;
Dudenhoeffer et al., 2006)
Natural disaster
management
Hurricane evacuation (Chen et al., 2006; Dow and Cutter,
2002)
Flood management (Dawson et al., 2011)
Earthquake and tsunami management (Mas et al., 2012)
Transport and travel Transport logistics (Davidsson et al., 2005)
Travel behavior (Pel et al., 2012)
Source: Arifin et al., 2016 with permission from the source.
a References for papers cited in this table can be found in Arifin et al. (2016).
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Accountable Care Organization agent. A simplified model architecture for
the ABM is shown in Fig. 1.
4.3. Agents’ attributes
In this section, we describe the attributes of Patient, Physician Group,
and Insurance Company agents in the healthcare supply network. Below
we describe attributes associated with each agent in the healthcare
supply network.
Patient Agent. First, we examine the Patient agent. Our ABM accom-
modates the creation of 200,000 patients. At the beginning of the
simulation, each patient is randomly assigned to an insurance group and
a physician group that is affiliated with that insurance group. In addition,
a patient is randomly assigned a wealth level as well as a binary indicator
for whether a patient is price sensitive or not. The wealth level is a
measurement of the income level of a patient. Once it is randomly
assigned, it will remain with the patient until the end of the simulation.
Importantly, at the beginning of the simulation, a patient is also
randomly assigned a set level of service expectation. Service expectation
represents the quality level of service that the patient is expecting from a
physician group. Table A1 in the appendix provides more detail on the
Patient agent.
Physician Group Agent. Next, we describe the Physician Group agent. A
Physician Group agent has a set capacity and level of service quality that it
provides to its patients. A Boolean indicator (inACO) describes whether a
Physician Group is a member of the ACO and this indicator changes in
response to the changes in the environment, based on a set of behavioral
rules that will be described later in the manuscript. We also track the
number of patient visits, and the group's yearly profit as well as cumu-
lative profit. Table A2 in the appendix provides more detail on the
Physician Group agent.
The computation of a Physician Group's yearly profit, profitYearly,
depends on its ACO status. For non-members, the computation of prof-
itYearlynonACO follows the following formula:
profitYearlynonACO ¼ revenueYearlynonACO – costYearlynonACO (1)
Where:
revenueYearlynonACO ¼ perVisitRevenueConstantnonACO * numVisits (2)
costYearlynonACO ¼ fixedCostnonACO þ
(unitCostConstantnonACO*numVisits) (3)
fixedCostnonACO ¼ fixedCostConstantnonACO*Capacity (4)
The cumulative profit, profitCumulativenonACO, is the summation of
profitYearlynonACO over the years.
For ACO members, the computation of profitYearlyACO follows the
following formula:
profitYearlyACO ¼ revenueYearlyACO – costYearlyACO þ
costSharingConstant*numVisits (5)
Where:
revenueYearlyACO ¼ perVisitRevenueConstantACO * numVisits (6)
costYearlyACO ¼ fixedCostACO þ (unitCostConstantACO*numVisits) (7)
fixedCostACO ¼ fixedCostConstantACO*Capacity (8)
The cumulative profit, profitCumulativeACO, is the summation of
profitYearlyACO over the years.
Table 6 reports the initial values used to set up the Physician Group
agent. Note here that we assume that by joining an ACO, on average, a
physician group will achieve a cost reduction of $20/patient visit.
Further, our model assumes that by joining an ACO, a member physician
office will share a portion (50%, or $10/patient visit) of the cost savings.
These are reasonable assumptions based on ACOs’ cost-saving goals and
reward structure (CMS.gov).
Insurance Company Agents. There are three Insurance Company agents.
The first one, AffordMe, has the lowest premium and consequently,
Physician Group agents associated with AffordMe on average offer the
lowest service quality. The second one, BetterLife, has a slightly higher
premium than AffordMe and on average offers a slightly higher service
quality to its patient base. The last one, CareTop, has the highest pre-
mium, and physicians associated with CareTop on average offer the
highest service quality. The differentiation among three insurance agents
mimics a common practice in Region S, where insurance premium ranges
from the least expensive group with the most restrictive healthcare
supplier selection, i.e., managed care health insurance; to the moderately
Table 6
Initial parameters for physician groups: ACO vs. non-ACO group.
Name Description Non-ACO group ACO group
joiningCostConstant Administrative cost associated
with joining ACO.
$0 $20,000
perVisitRevenueConstant Average revenue received by
Physician Groups at each patient
visit.
$250 $250
unitCostConstant Average cost incurred at
Physician Groups at each patient
visit.
$50 $30
costSharingConstant A cash rebate received by ACO
members for reaching cost
reduction targets.
$0 $10/Visit
fixedCostConstant Average overhead per capacity. $20 $20
Capacity Capacity of a Physician Group. Uniform distribution (2000, 6000)
ServiceQuality Service quality level at each
Physician Group.
Normal distribution with a mean of (2.5, 3.0, 3.5) and
standard deviation of (.5, .5, .5) for Physician Groups affiliated
with insurance group AffordMe, BetterLife, and CareTop,
respectively.
Similar to non-ACO members except with a 0.08
reduction in ServcieQuality (i.e.,
0.92*ServiceQuality of non-ACO members).
Fig. 1. A simplified class diagram of the model architecture in the ABM.
Legend: “1 and 1..*” signify one-to-many relationships among network agents.
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expensive group with a wider range of selection of healthcare providers,
i.e., Preferred Provider Organizations; to the most expensive group with
the widest selection of healthcare providers, i.e., indemnity coverage. For
a discussion on the different types of health premiums and their clinical
quality performance tradeoffs, please refer to Robinson (2003). In gen-
eral, a wider selection of healthcare providers is related to higher service
quality, as highly qualified doctors tend to accept premium health in-
surance and reject low premium insurance (Galewitz, 2020).
Service quality is modeled on a [0, 6] continuous interval, with zero
representing the lowest and six representing the highest service quality.
This allows a 7-point scale. Research shows that having more scale points
improves precision, yet there is a diminishing return if too many scale
points are used (Nunnally, 1994). A 7-point scale is more discriminative
than a 5-point scale and is a happy medium, as it does not require the
maintenance of too many response categories. Service quality of physi-
cian groups affiliated with AffordMe follows a normal distribution with a
mean of 2.5 and a standard deviation of 0.5. Service quality of physician
groups affiliated with BetterLife follows a normal distribution with a
mean of 3.0 and a standard deviation of 0.5. Service quality of physician
groups affiliated with CareTop follows a normal distribution with a mean
of 3.5 and a standard deviation of 0.5. Because CareTop charges the
highest premium, if the service levels from BetterLife or AffordMe do not
meet the expectations and patients are wealthy enough, patients may
consider switching from BetterLife or AffordMe to CareTop and its affili-
ated physician group. Table A3 in the appendix provides more detail on
the Insurance Company agent.
4.4. Environmental change
The introduction of an ACO is considered an environmental change. It
imposes cost and quality implications to network agents. As we
mentioned earlier, physician groups that are members of an ACO incur a
lower cost for each patient visit—and at the end of the year, the physician
groups share 50% of the cost savings. At the same time, ACOmembership
also incurs a quality penalty of 8%, as supported by empirical data. This
means that once a physician group joins an ACO, its service level is
automatically reduced to 92% of its previous level. This penalty is lifted
once a physician group exits an ACO.
4.5. Behavioral rules
The Patient agent exhibits switching behavior where the patient
switches to a different physician group if he or she is not satisfied with
the quality received. For a given physician's office visit, if the service
level received is equal to or exceeds the patient's expectation, then the
patient will continue to stay with the physician's office. However, if the
service level is below the patient's expectation, then the patient will
decide on whether to switch physician groups or not, depending on the
patient's wealth level. If the patient is wealthy enough (or is price
insensitive) and is not satisfied with the service experience, the switch
flag will be turned on and the patient will switch to a different insurance
group and, via the different insurance group, switch to a new set of
physicians. This switch only happens once at the end of the year, simu-
lating what happens in real life, i.e., switching insurance group is an
infrequent event and typically is only allowed during the yearly open
enrollment period.
The Physician Groups decide to join or exit an ACO based on rules
stated in Table 7. As a general principle, a physician group that is a
member of the ACO will stay in the ACO, if the average profit of ACO
members exceeds that of non-ACO members. The opposite scenario will
decrease the physician group's probability of staying in the ACO. On the
other hand, a physician group that is not a member of the ACO will in-
crease its probability of joining, if the average profit per physician group
is higher for ACOmembers than for non-ACOmembers. Otherwise, it will
decrease its probability of joining. Table 7 also accommodates situations
where the ACO profit is negative.
4.6. Scenario/experiment design
We created a base scenario to simulate the growth of an ACO. The
parameters used in the base scenario are depicted in Table 2. We ran the
base scenario 10 times and the outputs represent the average of the 10
simulations.
In order to examine factors that influence the growth of the ACO, we
contrasted the base scenario with additional experiments. First, research
shows that the behavior of a complex system is sensitive to initial con-
ditions (Kolen and Pollack, 1990). As mentioned earlier, our base sce-
nario is based on an empirical dataset collected in the Midwest region of
the United States, which revealed a participation rate of approximately
5% in the starting year of ACOs. To investigate the impact of varying
level of initial participation rates on the long-term development of ACOs,
we varied the initial percentage of ACO membership by doubling and
tripling the percentages to 10% (Experiment 1 or E1) and 15% (Experi-
ment 2 or E2) of the physician group base, or 6 (and 9) out of 60. We
reran each scenario 10 times and computed the average. Second, we were
interested in the discrepancy between ACOs' official objectives (i.e.,
improving both cost and quality) and the quality degradation supported
by empirical data. We ran a what-if analysis by removing the quality
penalty parameter from the base scenario (Experiment 3 or E3), rerun-
ning the simulation 10 times, and computing the average. Third, to
Table 7





X/Y (R) Prob of joining ACO (P)
If X is not a member of ACO Initial P ¼ 0.5
1 þ þ R > 1 P¼P-R
2 R<¼1 P¼P þ R
3 – þ N/A P ¼ 1 (join)
4 þ – N/A P ¼ 0.5
5
– –
R > 1 P¼P þ R
6 R<¼1 P¼P–R





X/Y (R) Prob of joining ACO (P)
8 þ þ R > 1 P ¼ 1.0
9 R<¼1 P¼P–1þR
10 – þ N/A P ¼ 0.5 (drop from ACO)
11 þ – N/A P ¼ 1
12 – – N/A P ¼ 0.5
Note: Sign* refers to the sign of the value, i.e., positive or negative.
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realistically understand ACOs' impact on physician groups’ profit, we
simulated an environment where no ACO is allowed (i.e., the probability
of ACO is set to 0; Experiment 4 or E4). Again, we reran the simulation 10
times and computed the average. Table 8 summarizes the four
experiments.
4.7. Output measures
We report both textual and graphical outputs from the simulation
runs. The yearly output tracks the attributes of each agent. For example,
for the physician group, we track its annual number of patient visits, cost
structure, revenue and profit (both annual and cumulative), its ACO
membership status, etc.
In addition, we also report graphical outputs from the simulation
runs. For each year, a single yearly graph depicts the dynamic network
that connects all physician groups to their corresponding insurance
companies, and also shows which of the physician groups are currently
members of the ACO. As a result of the dynamic interaction between the
patients, physician groups, insurance companies, and the ACO, patients
switch insurance companies as well as physician groups. Depending on
the yearly cost, revenue, and profit, each physician group, at the end of
every year, may join or leave the ACO. The yearly graph accordingly
portrays these dynamic changes for each year. Fig. 2 provides an example
of the evolution of ACO membership for one simulation over the course
of 10 years (we report results at the end of odd years only in order to fit
all graphs into one page).
All graphical information was first saved in the DOT format, which is
a plain-text graph description language. Then, each DOT file was visu-
alized by an open-source graph visualization software called Graphviz
(http://www.graphviz.org/).
4.8. Model features, assumptions, and simulations
We assume the presence of one ACO, three insurance companies, 60
physician groups, and 200,000 patients. All agents are non-spatial (i.e.,
they do not possess any explicit spatial information). The ABM is
implemented as discrete-event computer simulations in the Java
programming language. Time is modeled in yearly time steps, with each
simulation running for at least 10 years. A sample simulation run takes
about 10 min to output 10-year results data on a 2.8 GHz Intel Core i7
Apple Macintosh computer with 16 GB of memory.
5. Results and discussion
5.1. The expansion and contraction of ACO networks
5.1.1. The base scenario
First, we report the simulation results on the expansion and
contraction of ACO membership in the base scenario. In the base sce-
nario, the initial probability of a physician group belonging to an ACO,
PACO, is set at 5%, following our empirical findings in Region S. Fig. 3
below depicts the growth of ACO membership throughout the 10 simu-
lation periods.
As shown in Fig. 3, in the initial state, three out of 60 physician groups
joined the ACO. This number increased to 27 at the end of the simulation.
When we examined the evolution of the ACO, we noted four distinctive
stages. In period 1 to period 2, we first experienced a “wait-and-see” stage
in which the number of physician groups in the ACO remained small
(<1%). However, this stage passed quickly. Between period 2 and period
5, we witnessed a “rollercoaster” stage where we saw first a rapid
expansion of ACOmembership (from 3 to 17 and then to 19), representing
approximately 10%–400% of positive growth rate, which was then fol-
lowed by a fast decline (from 19 to 11) in period 5, representing approx-
imately 43% negative growth rate. The third stage was a “steady growth”
stage where the number of physician groups in the ACO increased grad-
ually, at a rate of over 10%. Finally came stage four, the “stabilizing” stage
where the number of physician groups in an ACO remained steady, with
approximately 10% or less fluctuations. Table 9 below summarizes these
stages, their defining characteristics, as well as growth rate.
Because physician groups make the decision to join an ACO based on
their peers’ performance, the initial adoption of ACO is somewhat slow,
as very few members are part of the ACO and the probability of these
members outperforming a great majority of the other physician groups is
slim. Therefore, a large number of physician groups are in the wait-and-
see mode. Then, as the cost savings for ACOmembers starts to take effect,
other physician groups observe the benefit of the ACO and decide to join.
We see a fast increase in membership. However, while ACO membership
can potentially save costs and share savings for physician offices, it also
brings with it a penalty associated with quality degradation, which re-
sults in a great reduction in patient visits (and thus revenue generation).
Therefore, we start to see a rollercoaster effect as existing members exit
the ACO right after a large amount of new physician offices enter the
ACO. This stage allows the best-fit physician office to remain in the ACO
and screens out ill-fitting ones so we see a steady growth thereafter.
Eventually, the system seems to stabilize over the long run.
We also noticed, through our iterations of simulations, that during the
10-year evolution of the ACO network, if at any year, the number of
physician groups in an ACO reaches 60, or 100%, then this number will
remain for the rest of the 10 years. Similarly, if at any year, the number of
physician groups in an ACO is 0, or 0%, then this number will also remain
for the rest of the 10 years. The extreme cases seem to have invoked a
swarming effect (Reynolds, 1987). In the case of full participation in
ACO, because all physician groups are a part of the ACO, there is no
benchmark information available for physician groups not in an ACO in a
particular region. Therefore, the situation deters the exit of physician
groups from the ACO. Similarly, when there is no physician group
entering the ACO, there is no benchmark information for ACO members,
and physician groups tend to remain non-ACO.
5.1.2. Sensitivity to initial state
Next, we investigated the impact of initial conditions on the evolution
of the ACO. In the follow-up scenario (E1), we varied the parameter of
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physician groups associated
with BetterLife stand to gain
by joining ACO. Physician
Groups associated with
AffordMe and CareTop are
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Fig. 2. A graphical representation of expansion and contraction of ACO.
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60 physician groups belonging to an ACO at the initiation of the simu-
lation. Results of the simulation for E1 are reported in Fig. 4.
Compared to Fig. 3, Fig. 4 shows a much steadier trend of expansion
of ACO size. Here we see three distinctive stages. Similar to the base
scenario, in period 1 to period 2, we first experience a “wait-and-see”
stage in which the number of physician groups in the ACO remains small
and constant. This stage passes quickly. The second stage can be seen as
“fast growth” where the number of ACO membership increases from 5 to
40 (in period 3) and then to 53 (in period 4). In the third stage, which
lasts from periods 5 to 10, we witness a “stabilizing” stage where the
number of ACO members largely remains stable.
This suggests that the evolution of ACO membership is subject to
initial state. If there is a relatively large presence of ACO membership at
the beginning of the simulation, it is likely to have included a balanced
mixture of physician groups at different service quality levels. This helps
to set a more realistic baseline for ACO members. When non-ACO
members decide to join or not to join the ACO, they compare their
own cost attributes to this baseline. This helps to recruit physician groups
that are a good fit with ACO cost and quality profiles. This in turn fuels a
steady growth of best-fit members and avoids a turbulent rollercoaster
state (as depicted in Fig. 3) where a large number of physician groups are
entering and exiting the ACO.
We varied the parameter of PACO to 15% in Experiment 2, tripling that
of the base scenario. This resulted in a pattern very similar to that of 10%.
We witnessed the same stages of growth and similar number of physician
groups in each stage.
5.1.3. The quality and cost tradeoff
Although the official objective of ACOs is to save healthcare costs while
maintainingahigh level ofhealthcare servicequality (CMS.gov), the second
Fig. 4. Growth of ACO membership (PACO ¼ 10%).
Fig. 3. Growth of ACO (base scenario PACO ¼ 5%).
Table 9
Description of stages.




Wait-and-see Initial state with very low
enrollment.
<1% Base Scenario;
ACO at 10%; no
quality penalty.
Rollercoaster State of volatility, with
alternate stages of high levels
of positive growth rate,
followed immediately by a





Fast growth Consecutive states of positive,
high growth rate.
>¼ 10% Base scenario, ACO
at 10%; no quality
penalty




Sticky state Alternate states of low to
moderate levels of positive
growth rate, followed
immediately by a low to
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objective has been questioned (Kelleher et al., 2015). In our base scenario,
we apply a quality penalty parameter, Pp, to physician groups that are a
memberof theACOandset thePpvalue to0.92, basedonempiricaldata.But
what ifmembers of ACOare able tomeet bothobjectives?Next,we contrast
the base scenario with E3 that removes the penalty parameter associated
with ACO members. The result is reported in Fig. 5.
After removing the quality penalty parameter, the pattern of ACO
growth reveals three stages. Periods 1 and 2 depict the “wait-and-see”
stage, which is similar to the previous scenarios. Then a “fast growth”
stage was seen to occur in period 3. What is interesting is that after the
fast growth stage, we encountered a new stage we term as “sticky state”
where the number of physician groups in an ACO fluctuates up and down;
a small expansion will be followed by a small contraction and vice versa.
Overall, there is no huge increase or decrease in the membership.
Because of the removal of quality penalty, compared to the base
scenario, we do not see the rollercoaster effect where a massive amount
of physician groups with lower service quality exit the ACO. The resulting
ACO is comprised of physician groups with a variety of cost and service
levels. The sticky state reflects slight increases and decreases of ACO
membership due to random variation of patients’ experience.
5.2. The impact of ACO on physician groups’ cumulative profit
For the base scenario,we computed the cumulative profit (Profitb) at the
end of Year 10 for each of the 60 physician groups. Physician groups in the
base scenario have the option of joining the ACO. We then created a con-
trasting scenariowhere the ACO is not an option and computed cumulative
profit for each of the 60 physician groups (Profitc). Next,we conducted two-
tailed two-sample t-tests to compare the difference in cumulative profits
across the two scenarios for physician groups affiliated with each of the
three insurance companies: AffordMe, BetterLife, and CareTop. T-tests are
commonly used in experimental design to detect the differences in mean
values between base groups and experimental groups (Brown and Mel-
amed, 1990). Here we use t-tests to detect the differences in mean cumu-
lative profits between ACO member physician groups and non-ACO
member physician groups. Results of the t-tests are reported in Table 10.
As shown in Table 10, there are statistically significance differences
(at the p < 0.001 level) in the cumulative profits of physician groups
affiliated with each of the three insurance companies. Specifically, for
physician groups in the AffordMe category, the mean cumulative profit
for non-ACO members is 15816726 and for ACO members is 12830478.
The difference is statistically significant at the p < 0.001 level. This
finding suggests that ACO membership leads to a deterioration of
cumulative profit for physician groups within the AffordMe category.
Similarly, there are statistically significant differences between ACO and
non-ACO physician groups in CareTop and BetterLife categories, where
physician groups in CareTop encounter a deterioration in cumulative
profit under ACO and physician groups in BetterLife receive higher cu-
mulative profit under ACO. These findings suggest that physician groups
affiliated with both AffordMe and CareTop were worse off with the ACO
option. However, the ACO option benefitted physician groups affiliated
with the BetterLife insurance company.
Physician groups affiliated with AffordMe have the lowest average
service quality level. Due to the quality–cost tradeoff, participation in
ACOwill deteriorate service quality even further. We then witness a large
number of patients switching to other healthcare providers with higher
service level. This results in a decrease in the number of visits (and thus
revenue) for AffordMe physicians. For this group of physicians, the loss in
revenue exceeds gain in cost savings, which results in a reduction in
profit.
Physician groups affiliated with CareTop have the highest average
service quality. However, service quality degradation impacts CareTop as
well. On average, patients in the CareTop group have the highest service
expectations among all patients. If they are not satisfied, they will move
away from CareTop and reduce the number of patient visits (and thus
revenue). Further, the CareTop group is also associated with the highest
healthcare premium. If a patient from a less expensive insurance group is
not satisfied with the service experience and is ready to switch, CareTop
may not be an option for them due to their wealth level.
Physician groups affiliated with BetterLife benefit most from ACO
formation. Although BetterLife suffers from quality degradation as well, it
is in a strategic position where it can receive new patients switching from
CareTop as well as from AffordMe. For patients switching from AffordMe,
BetterLife is a more attractive choice due to its lower healthcare premium
Fig. 5. Growth of ACO membership without quality penalty.
Table 10
Comparison of cumulative profit: ACO option vs. no ACO option.
AffordMe BetterLife CareTop
Mean value (ACO option ¼ Yes) 12830478 18071294.12 9179104
Standard deviation 301319 349320 328214
Sample size 25 17 18
Mean value (ACO option ¼ No) 15816726 11773208 9818500
Standard deviation 342367 259935 219905
Sample size 19 25 16
p-value for t-Test p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.001
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compared to that of CareTop and higher service quality. For patients
switching from CareTop, BetterLife is also a more attractive choice due to
its higher service quality compared to that of AffordMe. Thus, BetterLife
stands to gain most from ACO due to the increased number of patient
visits and subsequent revenue and profit increases.
6. Conclusions, implications, and future research directions
The emergence of ACOs is a relatively new phenomenon in the U.S.
healthcare network. While many believe this might save the healthcare
system, others opine that the prospects look bleak—but there is a
consensus that data-driven analysis is warranted (Terry, 2013). We
argued that traditional analytic methods fail to capture the complexity of
the healthcare network and the interactions amongst the agents. We
proposed a CAS approach as being more realistic in representing this
phenomenon.
Our research examined a pressing issue in the healthcare supply
network, the establishment of the ACO, its expansion, and its impact on
physician groups’ profit. We found that the evolution of an ACO goes
through different stages, and the pattern of growth is influenced by both
its initial condition and the cost and quality tradeoff. When an ACO
contains a small percentage of physician groups at initiation, it will
experience a period of fast growth followed by a fast decline, as non-
members are first attracted by the cost savings experienced by the
initial few members and are then turned off by patient deflection due to
service quality degradation. However, when an ACO contains a relatively
large percentage of physician groups at initiation, it is likely that there is
a basket of physician groups with varying levels of service quality. In such
a case, the growth of the ACO is based on comparison to a stable base of
quality and cost indicators and therefore we are likely to see stable
growth. Thus, one factor that facilitates ACO growth is to include a larger
number and variety of physician groups at initiation.
Both joining and rejoining an ACO cost money and resources. There
are administrative costs associatedwith membership, such as the training
of personnel to be in compliance with ACO rules, which occur both at the
physician group as well as at the healthcare administrative agency. This
is a manifestation of the classic network externality issue where the value
derived from a network and thereby its success critically depend on the
number of participants in the network. Therefore, it is more prudent for
policy makers to promote a stable increasing trend of ACO membership.
Our results suggest that policy makers should encourage a greater
number of physician offices to be pioneers of ACO programs. In addition,
we encourage a variety of physician offices of different cost and quality
profiles to be included in the initial pioneering organizations to set up a
more realistic benchmark baseline. A proactive approach in rewarding
such pioneering organizations might go a long way in the eventual suc-
cess of ACOs.
We also addressed the quality and cost tradeoff and showed that if
cost savings associated with ACOs can be reached without sacrificing
quality, the adoption pattern is more stable. While our results were an
offshoot of the settings of our CAS based on empirical data, this never-
theless suggests that policy makers should design incentives and promote
higher quality services for ACO members.
Finally, we examined the impact of ACOs on physician groups’ profit.
We found that ACO benefits accrue most for middle-tier physician groups
that offer a relatively good quality service at a relatively reasonable cost.
Physician groups at different quality levels should be made aware of the
impact of ACOmembership on their patient flow, revenue, and profit. For
example, our research suggests that at the current state of ACO devel-
opment, physician groups that offer superior services at a premium cost
should use caution before joining ACOs. The cost and quality tradeoff
that is evident in empirical data suggests a detrimental effect on the
service quality offered by these premium physician groups. As a result,
simulation analysis shows a degradation on cumulative profit. However,
if in the future, ACOs could achieve their stated objectives, i.e., saving
cost while improving service quality, then it will be more advantageous
for these high quality physician groups to join an ACO. In general,
physician groups should only make the entrance decision after carefully
conducting a cost and benefit analysis.
Our research examined the growth of the ACO and investigated its
impact on the healthcare supply network. We used the CAS perspective to
simulate agents in the healthcare supply network and the learning and
adaptation behavior of agents in response to changes in the environment.
As such we were able to derive patterns of ACO evolution and offer
managerially relevant insights to physician groups as well as policy
makers.
From a managerial and practitioner perspective, we hope our study
will spur further analysis of the assumptions and behavior of the various
stakeholders in a healthcare system that will continue to see increased
participation in ACOs. The introduction of ACOs in the U.S. healthcare
network is a very significant innovation to the system. However, it re-
mains to be seen whether it will be successful or not. The call of the hour
is certainly to look at data and analysis and provide information to the
participants to help them be successful in this new environment. If this
does not happen, there is a real risk that the fate of ACOs will go the same
way as another healthcare innovation not too long ago—HMOs or health
maintenance organizations. HMOs are now widely considered to be a
failure largely due to the lack of data availability to make sound decisions
in that environment. We hope our study will spawn further analysis using
multiple analytical lenses to inform how ACOs will play out in the
healthcare system. The more data analysis and insight generated, the
better the chance that ACOs will be successful.
One of the main obstacles to the success of ACOs is the level of
participation by various providers to form or join an ACO. Given the
uncertainty around the measures and financial incentives, it is possible
that many providers may stay away from ACOs. To address this critical
issue, our results offer some preliminary evidence about the participation
level of physician groups.
While the CAS perspective offers an interesting and appropriate
approach to capture the complex nature of the emergence of ACOs, our
study constitutes a small first step in that direction. There are several
opportunities and avenues to expand our research. First, the formation of
ACOs is at its initial stage and there exists a certain degree of vagueness
associated with ACO rules. A follow-up model could incorporate the U.S.
government as an agent and examine different incentive designs that
could impact the adoption of ACOs and operation performance of
physician groups. For instance, these incentive programs could incor-
porate an exit penalty, design varying levels of cost saving structures
according to ACO developmental stages, or design varying levels of cost
saving structures according to tenure within an ACO. Second, our
research shows that the initial number of physician groups in an ACO
matters to the pattern of adoption. A follow-up study could incorporate
other aspects of the initial state such as the composition of ACOmembers,
and examine how their quality level impacts the expansion of the ACO.
Third, we based our research on the regional healthcare network in an
area located in the Midwest of the United States. Future research could
develop supply networks based on other regions, especially metropolitan
areas, to see if different patterns of adoption emerge. Lastly, given that
our qualitative interviews revealed limitation of treatment options and
reduction in treatment flexibility as two potential factors to explain
quality tradeoff, a future study might extend the existing model, which is
profitability driven, to incorporate social welfare. An interesting exten-
sion of this model is to maximize the overall social welfare from a policy
maker's perspective.
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